Weaknesses in real-world protocols

Martin Stanek

Department of Computer Science
Comenius University
stanek@dcs.fmph.uniba.sk

Cryptology 1 (2020/21)

Content

KRACK

Dragonfly (SAE)

Bluetooth

KRACK

- Key Reinstallation Attacks (Vanhoef, Piessens, 2017)
  - just an idea
  - details and paper available at www.krackattacks.com
- WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access)
  - WPA – 802.11i (draft D3.0); WPA2 – 802.11i (final version D9.0)
  - two data confidentiality and integrity protocols: (WPA-)TKIP and (AES-)CCMP
  - 802.11ad amendment: Galios/Counter Mode Protocol (GCMP)
- 4-way handshake protocol
  - mutual authentication based on PMK (Pairwise Master Key)
  - PMK derived from preshared secret (WPA-Personal) or negotiated in 802.1x (WPA-Enterprise)
  - establish a session key PTK (Pairwise Transient Key)
- supplicant/station (client) and authenticator (AP)

4-way handshake

- simplified presentation
- 4-way handshake:
  1. AP $\longrightarrow$ S: ANonce (now the supplicant can derive PTK)
  2. $S \longrightarrow$ AP: SNonce, MIC_{KCK} (now the authenticator can derive PTK)
  3. AP $\longrightarrow$ S: GTK, MIC_{KCK} (GTK encrypted with KEK)
  4. $S \longrightarrow$ AP: Ack, MIC_{KCK} (Ack)
- MIC (Message Integity Check)
- GTK (Group Temporal Key . . . broadcast/multicast)
- PTK = PRF(PMK, AP_{Mac}, S_{Mac}, ANonce, SNonce), divided into
  - KCK (EAPOL-Key Confirmation Key) – for MIC computation
  - KEK (EAPOL-Key Encryption Key) – for encryption of GTK
  - TK (Temporal Key) – for encryption of data frames
  - TMK1, TMK2 (Temporal AP MIC Key) – keys for MIC computation (unicast), one for each direction

KRACK – idea

- remark: offline dictionary attack (4th message), no forward secrecy
- the third (or the first) message can be retransmitted (multiple times)
  - for example, if the authenticator does not receive message 4 (or 2)
  - reinstall the PTK and reset initialization vector (nonce) for data encryption and authentication
  - according 802.11i "AP retransmits message 1 or 3 if it did not receive a reply"
- behavior of clients differs (depends on NIC and supplicant implementation)
- other variants: key reinstallation against group key handshake ...

KRACK – impact

- CCMP – AES-CCM (CTR and CBC-MAC)
  - key and IV are re-used, i.e. keystream is re-used
  - attacker can decrypt
- GCMP – AES-GCM
  - keystream re-use
  - authentication key can be recovered after nonce reuse (Joux, 2006)
  - attacker can decrypt and inject own data
- special weakness in Android and Linux:
  - retransmitted message 3 causes all-zero key
- other variants of KRACK attack (2018)

Dragonfly (SAE)

- WPA3 (2018)
- mandatory: new protocol Simultaneous Authentication of Equals (SAE)
- original design – Harkins (2008)
  - balanced PAKE protocol
  - IEEE 802.11-2016
  - RFC 7664 (Dragonfly Key Exchange)
  - other variants: EAP-pwd (RFC 5931), IKEv2 Secure PSK Authentication (RFC 6617)
- EAP-pwd: can be used in some enterpise WiFi networks
- SAE is used to derive new PMK for the 4-way handshake
  - does not prevent KRACK per-se
  - prevents offline dictionary attack
  - ensures forward secrecy
- M. Vanhoef, E. Ronen: *Dragonblood: Attacking the Dragonfly Handshake of WPA3* (2019) – weaknesses in SAE and EAP-pwd

Dragonfly (SAE) – introduction

- simplified for presentation
- main goals and properties
  - no fixed roles (e.g. initiator, client, server, ...)
  - both parties can initiate the protocol (simultaneously)
  - forward secrecy
  - resistance to offline dictionary attack (and other attacks)
  - based on DLOG problem
- proposed for modular and elliptic curves groups
  - parameters: primes p, q, and $q \mid (p-1)$
  - modular group: subgroup of order q is used
  - elliptic curve group over GF(p): group order q, curve $y^2 = x^3 + ax^2 + b \bmod p$
- H – hash function (random oracle); KDF – key derivation function

Dragonfly (SAE) – password element P

- map password pw to a group element P
- hash to group:

for counter in range(1, 256):
  seed = $H(\text{addr}_A, \text{addr}_B, pw, \text{counter})$
  $x = \text{KDF}(\text{seed}, p)$
  if $x \geq p$: continue
  $P = x^{(p-1)/q} \bmod p$
  if $P > 1$: return P

- hash to curve:

base = pw, counter = 1
while counter++ < 40 or P not found:
  seed = $H(\text{addr}_A, \text{addr}_B, \text{base}, \text{counter})$
  $x = \text{KDF}(\text{seed}, p)$
  if $x \geq p$: continue
  if $x^3 + ax + b \in \text{QR}_p$ and P not found:
    $P = (x, \text{sqrt}(x^3 + ax + b) \bmod p)$
    base = random()
return P

SAE – protocol

1. Commit Exchange (presentation uses elliptic curves)
   - A select random $r_A, m_A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$;
     A computes $s_A = (r_A + m_A) \bmod q$, and $E_A = -m_A \cdot P$
   - B select random $r_B, m_B \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$;
     B computes $s_B = (r_B + m_B) \bmod q$, and $E_B = -m_B \cdot P$

     $A \longrightarrow B: \quad s_A, E_A$
     $B \longrightarrow A: \quad s_B, E_B$

   - check validity of s_X, check that E_X is on the curve
   - shared secret element K is computed:

     A: $K = r_A \cdot (s_B \cdot P + E_B) = r_A \cdot ((r_B + m_B) \cdot P - m_B \cdot P) = (r_A r_B) \cdot P$
     B: $K = r_B \cdot (s_A \cdot P + E_A) = r_B \cdot ((r_A + m_A) \cdot P - m_A \cdot P) = (r_A r_B) \cdot P$

   - shared key $k = H(K)$

SAE – protocol (2)

2. Confirmation Exchange
   - verify k and transcript of the protocol:

     $A \rightarrow B: \quad c_A = \mathrm{HMAC}_k(s_A, E_A, s_B, E_B)$
     $B \rightarrow A: \quad c_B = \mathrm{HMAC}_k(s_B, E_B, s_A, E_A)$

- variants of Dragonfly differ in
  - computation of password element
  - computation of confirmation messages
  - key derivation and usage (e.g. multiple keys are derived), ...

SAE – some earlier results

- D. Clarke, F. Hao: Cryptanalysis of the Dragonfly Key Exchange Protocol (2013)
  - offline dictionary attack for small subgroups
  - important to perform checks in "Commit Exchange" step (validity of E_X and s_X)
- J. Lancrenon, M. Škrobot: On the Provable Security of the Dragonfly Protocol (2015)
  - security proof in model by Bellare, Pointcheval and Rogaway (other models exist)
  - assumptions: random oracle model (H), CDH, DIDH (Decisional Inverted-Additive Diffie-Hellman)
  - DIDH: hard to distinguish $g^{1/(x+y)}$ and a random $g^{1/z}$ when given $g^{1/x}$ and $g^{1/y}$.

Timing attacks – MODP groups

- hash to group – number of iterations depends on password
  - KDF returns bit string of length $|p|$
  - probability that $x \geq p$ is not negligible for some groups
  - RFC 5114 – group 22 (30.84%), group 23 (32.40%), group 24 (47.01%)
  - Is the difference between r and $r + 1$ iterations measurable?
    Yes (see the experiments in Dragonblood paper)
    e.g. for group 22 $\approx$ 75 measurements were enough to identify r
  - number of iteration depends on MAC addresses as well
  - spoofing MAC, measuring iterations . . . building a password "profile"
  - offline dictionary/brute-force attack

Timing attacks – elliptic curves

- hash to curve for EAP-pwd
  - iterate until P is on the curve
  - similar timing leak as for hash to group
- hash to curve for SAE – timing attacks countermeasures already present
  - $x \geq p$ is not negligible for Brainpool curves (RFC 6932)
  - multiple measurements for a MAC:
    more iteration with real password yield lower variance
    average time depends on real iterations and number of $x \geq p$ results
    (see the experiments in Dragonblood paper)
  - cache attacks (Flush and Reload)
    - blinding the y value in the QR test
    - detection of QR test result in the first iteration
    - assumption: attacker runs a process on victim host (e.g. Android app)

Other issues and observations

- AP must store the password in plaintext
- WPA3 Transition Mode – AP accepts WPA3-SAE and WPA2 with the same password
  - compatibility with old clients
  - downgrade attack are detected, thanks to properties of 4-way handshake
  - attack has enough data for offline dictionary attacks
  - countermeasure: remember if the network supports WPA3-SAE ("pinning")
- high overhead of hash to curve
  - timing attacks defense (40 iterations) is costly for lightweight devices
  - existing DoS countermeasures can be defeated
    e.g. experiment with 8 connections/s – AP's CPU saturated
- fatal impact of bad PRNG
  - attacker reconstructs P and K
  - impact worse than bad PRNG in WPA2
- update to WPA3?

Bluetooth

- widely deployed protocol
  - mobile phones, laptops, fitness/smart watches, headphones, ...
- two protocols (similar):
  - Bluetooth BR/EDR – Secure Simple Pairing (SSP)
  - Bluetooth Low Energy – Low Energy Secure Connection (LE SC)
- goals for both protocols: confidentiality and MITM protection
- authenticated ECDH key exchange
- both protocols are vulnerable
- E.Biham, L. Neumann: *Breaking the Bluetooth Pairing – Fixed Coordinate Invalid Curve Attack* (2018)
- other attacks for older versions exist (e.g. crackle)

Invalid Curve Attack on ECDH

- ECDH (elliptic curve E, generator P):
  1. $A \longrightarrow B$: $U = u \cdot P$
  2. $B \longrightarrow A$: $V = v \cdot P$

  $\Rightarrow$ shared key: $K = (uv) \cdot P$
- attacker uses invalid points (not on the curve) to find shared key
  - group operation does not depend on b ($y^2 = x^3 + ax^2 + b$), see the "dlog" lecture
  - attacker can choose a curve E' (different b') with subgroup of small order
  - let P' be a generator, and q' is the order

Invalid Curve Attack on ECDH (2)

- attack:
  1. $A \longrightarrow M$: $U = u \cdot P$
  2. $M \longrightarrow A$: P' $\quad \ldots$ A computes $K = u \cdot P'$

  $\ldots$ $A \longrightarrow M$: $c = E_K(m)$
- assumption: M knows m
- M finds $u' \in \mathbb{Z}_{q'}$: $E_{u' \cdot P'}(m) = c \quad \Rightarrow \quad u \equiv u' \pmod{q'}$
- recovering u:
  - iterate attack for multiple times for different (co-prime) q'
  - use CRT to compute u
- assumptions:
  - the protocol can be executed multiple times and u does not change
  - attacker can choose arbitrary P'
- Bluetooth specification: to prevent this attack, refresh your parameters for every pairing

Fixed Coordinate Invalid Curve Attack (idea)

- let's ignore all other SSP / LE SC details
- main problem:
  y-coordinate is not authenticated (only x-coordinate of "public key")
- semi-passive attack:
  - set y-coordinate of both public keys to 0 (a curve with different b')
  - the order of these points is 2
  - if both "private keys" are even (prob. 25%), then $K = 0$ (point at infinity)
  - attacker knows the shared key (shared by both parties)
- fully-active attack:
  - improved attack with 50% probability of success
- large majority of the Bluetooth devices are vulnerable (CVE-2018-5383)
  - chips/implementations: Broadcom, Qualcomm, Intel / Apple, Google, ...